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REPLY ARGUMENT
REPLY TO RESPONDENTS POINT I
Respondents acknowledge the difference in the approach
to damages arrived at by the trial court in comparing the
"Memorandum Decision" with the formal "Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law", but claim, among other things, that

1

Appellants can't demonstrate that the Judgment would have
differed had the formal Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law been timely filed (Resp. Brief, page 7 ) .
The issue is not the amount of the Judgment that the
Court entered, but the basis both in law and fact upon which
it is predicated.

For example, did the trial court find that

$6,325.00 was expended by the landlord for repairs plus
general improvements as its Memorandum Decision suggests
(Record page 51)?

If so, we contend that the trial court erred

in allowing that portion of this amount that was expended for
general improvements inasmuch as the leased premises in this
case was only a "shell" to begin with and these general expenses
amount to capital improvements that the landlord would have made
in spite of the lease or any breach thereof by the tenant.
Or did the Court find that the entire $6,325.00 was
spent for repairs occasion by the tenants lease requirements
or their abuse of the leased property?

This is apparently

what the Court recites in its formal Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (Record, page 66). If so, we contend that the
evidence doesn't factually support these findings.

There is no

evidence in the Record as to the expense of improvements incurred
by the Respondents in providing for the special needs of the
Appellants which were lost by the breach (ie., "special sixfoot interior walls", etc.).

The only evidence with regard to

damage to the leased premises is that of the carpet and scuff
marks on the walls (Transcript, pages 78-79).

2

REPLY TO RESPONDENTS POINT II.
The case of Reid v. Mutual of Omaha, Insurance, 110
Utah Advance Reports, page 12, cited in Respondents Brief, in
some respects would appear to make the arguments in Appellants
original Brief moot.

This case was filed June 12, 1989, some

90 days after Notice of Appeal was filed.

Appellants had no

knowledge of the case at the time their original Brief was
prepared and filed.

In Reid, the Supreme Court determined that

when a commercial lease is breached by the tenant, a landlord
must take active steps to mitigate his damages.

These steps must

be "commercially reasonable" and include costs reasonably incurred
in readying the property for
the premises.

reletting or attempting to relet

The Court went on to say that in a given case, such

costs may include, not only expenses incurred in seeking new
tenants, but also costs of repairs or alterations of the premises
reasonably necessary to successfully relet them (Id. at page 17).
The Reid case appears to formulate the law in Utah with regard to
claims of lost rent by requiring a landlord to actively repair
and alter the premises in an effort to relet them.

With regard

to damages as it pertains to actual lost rent, the Supreme Court
in Reid mandates that the trial court retain jurisdiction to
adjust for future losses, occasioned by the interruption of
rentals (Id. at page 18).
Consistant with the Court's analysis in Reid that the
trial court retain jurisdiction to adjust for future losses of
rent to the landlord, is the proposition that credit should also
3

be given the tenant for any actual increase in rental income
to the landlord over the lifetime of the breached lease as a
result of reletting.

In other words, if the breaching tenant

is to be held accountable for repairs, alterations and other
improvements required to successfully relet the premises, he
should have increased rentals credited against those costs.
If the Court of Appeals follows the reasoning in Reid, it could
conclude that the arguments made by Appellants are rendered moot
by its decision.

It could reason that it matters not what label

the trial court placed upon the expenses incurred by Respondents,
and that those expenses, be they for necessary repair, general
capital improvements or special improvements are recoverable if
they were commercially reasonable and necessary in successfully
reletting the premises.

On this basis, the Judgment of the trial

court concerning that portion of its damage award would be
sustained.
Consistant with Reid, however, is this Court's obligation
to reduce the Judgment of the trial court by that amount of
money that the trial court determined that the Respondent gained
in increased rentals over the life of the lease by his successful
reletting to the new tenant.

The trial court found that amount

to be $5,040.00 (Record, page 51).
REPLY TO RESPONDENTS POINT III.
The Respondents, citing Reid, request the Court of Appeals
increase the Judgment to the full amount of $12,649.32 for repair
and alteration of the leased premises.
4

Point III is without merit as Respondents have not
cross-appealed.

Rule 4(d) of The Rules of The Utah Court of

Appeals require any Cross-Appeal to be filed within 14 days
after the date on which the first Notice of Appeal was filed
or within 30 days from final Judgment whichever period last
expires.

This Rule is identical to Rule 4(d) of The Rules of

The Utah Supreme Court.

The Advisory Committee Note to Rule

4(d) indicates that this paragraph adopts the time period and
concept of cross-appeal in Rule 4(d)(3) FRAP.
It is basic law that while a Respondent who has not
cross-appealed may argue in the Appellate Court in support of
the decision appealed from, he may not seek review to obtain a
decision more favorable to him than that appealed from by the
other party.

5 Am Jur 2d 152 (Appeal & Error i707) . Jaffke v.
*

— — — - — —

Dunham, 352 US 280, 1 L ed 2d 314, 77 Supreme Court 307.
Without notice of cross-appeal being filed or given,
the Court of Appeals is without jurisdiction to consider Respondent's
request that the Judgment be increased.

Griffen v. Southern Pacific

Railroad Company, 31 U 296, 87 P 1091 (1906);

Yost v. State, 640

P. 2d 1044 (Utah 1981); Burgers v. Maiben, 652 P.2d 1320 (Utah
1982); Bowen

v. Riverton City, 656 P.2d 434 (Utah 1982); Nelson

v. Stoker, 669 P.2d 390 (Utah 1983).

In summary, Respondents

may cite Reid v. Mutual of Omaha to support the Judgment but not
to increase it.

5

CONCLUSION
Reid v. Mutual of Omaha seems to govern the issue of
damages in this case.

Reid was filed after Appellants had

filed their Notice of Appeal and was unknown to them until
Respondents Brief was filed.

Until Reid/ the law of damages

in Utah was uncertain in cases of this type.

The trial court

used a formula for fixing damages unsatisfactory to Appellants
and they appealed.

The formula was apparently satisfactory

to Respondents as they filed no cross-appeal.

The Court of

Appeals has no jurisdiction to entertain Respondents request
to increase the Judgment.
it or modify it.

It does have jurisdiction to uphold

The reasoning in Reid dictates that credit

against the Judgment be given Appellants in the sum of $5,040.,
being the amount of increased rent over the life of the breached
lease.

The Judgment of the trial court should be reduced

accordingly and the case remanded for entry of the reduced
Judgment.
Respectfully submitted this X 7 ^

day of September, 1989.

/MICHAEL F. OLMSTEAD
Attorney for Appellants
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Secretary

7

ADDENDUM

8

2.
What they boil down to is, when a tenant breaches, the owner has
a duty to take steps to mitigate damages and lease to another
tenant as soon as is reasonably possible. In order to do that,
the owner usually must remodel and prepare the premises to the
desire of the new tenant. He is entitled to be reimbursed for
expenses incurred to the extent that they are expenses of
mitigation and not capital improvements which are likely to be
beneficial beyond the term of the new tenant.
The fix-up expenses testified to by defendant (the owner) and
his witness totaled $12,649.32. There was no testimony
specifying whether a particular expense was mitigation or
capital improvement. From an analysis of them, as to amount and
kind, the Court concludes that approximately 50% of them were
for the particular tenant, and the other half usable for any
tenant. Applying that to the testimony, defendant is entitled
to reimbursement of $6,325 (rounded).
Additionally, defendant is entitled to rent for part of March,
$250, for April, $790, and for one week in May, $184, a total of
$1224. Plaintiff is entitled to a credit of $500 in prepaid
rent and that leaves net rent due defendant in the amount of
$724. Evidence of attorney fees for defendant was in the sum of
$1,435, an amount the Court finds to be reasonable in light of
the subject matter and nature of the litigation, and the
experience of counsel on both sides. When those sums are
totaled they reach $8,484. It is pertinent to note also that
defendant will receive increased rent from the new tenant in the
24 months remaining on plaintiffs' term amounting to $5,040.
The Court grants judgment for $8,484 plus court costs to
defendant on his counter claim, and since a set-off has already
been accorded plaintiffs, finds in favor of defendant and
against plaintiffs on plaintiffs' comp

;e 2
an Warren
idings of Fact
nclusions of Law
2.

That the parties entered into a lease agreement on

ril 9, 1986 at $750,00 per month to lease units 2 and 3 at 12
uth Main, Layton Utah for the 1st year and $790.00 per month
r years 2 and 3 of the lease.
3.

That Plaintiff tenants breached said lease agreement

i March of 1987, with Defendants, by vacating the premises.
4.

That Defendants spent $12,649.32 to fix up the real

roperty previously leased by Plaintiff's.
5.

That Plaintiffs failed to pay rent in March of

250.00, April $790.00 and one week in May for $184.00.
6.

That Plaintiff's had prepaid $500.00 in rent.

7.

That the lease agreement specified Defendants could

ecover attorney's fees and Court costs.
8.

That Defendants did in fact hire an attorney in the

ibove matter.
9.

That 50% of Defendants' improvements were for general

improvement of the premises or another tenant and not expended
as a result of the lease between the parties.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The Circuit Court had jurisdiction over the above

entitled action.
2.

Defendant is entitled to and is hereby awarded a

judgment of $8,489.00 computed as follows:

1

did he have any c o n v e r s a t i o n with M r . H o o k e r about that.

2

Overruled.

He may ask.
THE W I T N E S S :

3

Q

4

(By

ttr.

Ask the q u e s t i o n again'.

Olmstead)

5

Stan

that, n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g

6

in line, Mr. H o o k e r was still

Did you -- did you

advise

the fact that he had a new tenant
responsible?

7

A

N o , I didn't advise Stan at a l l .

8

Q

One way or the o t h e r ?

9

A

No.

10

Q

Now this -- you m e n t i o n e d the damage to

11

the carpet and the walls and let's go to the w a l l s .

12

was some nail holes in the walls when they moved

There

out?

13

A

Yes.

14

Q

There was an area behind where his desk was

15

where the back of his chair had rubbed on the wall

16

creased the wall and stained

17

your o p i n i o n , would require replacing a section of sheet-

18

rock?
A

19
20

Y e s , or p a t c h i n g .

Q

I am sure that it could

patch

Do you have any idea what it would cost to

that?

23

A

I don't.

24

Q

Would the nail

25

it or w h a t e v e r , and that, in

be patched.

21
22

and

could the nail holes be

fixed with a little bit of spackle here and

there?

78

A

Y e a h , but then you would have to paint

Q

Repaint.

agai n.
What were the w a l l s , were they

painted wal1s --A

Yes.
that were provided for Mr. H o o k e r and

Q
Mrs. Thomas?
A

Yes.

Q

And what about -- what did you do to the

w a l l s after -- or what was done with the w a l l s w h e n U . S .
Title moved

in?

A

The e x t e r i o r w a l l s , of c o u r s e , were

patched and painted.
out.

The interior walls were all

redone,
taken

S i x - f o o t walls were not what they wanted so they all

had to come out, with the e x c e p t i o n of the
Q

bathroom.

W e l l , if I u n d e r s t a n d t h i s , part of the

work that was done for their needs were these i n t e r i o r w a l l s
to m a k e individual offices or c u b i c l e s ?
A

Yes.

Q

Were they solid walls to the ceiling or

were they just kind of c u b i c l e s ?
A

Just six-foot

Q

Six-foot h i g h .

high.
And those had to come out

for U . S . Title?
A

Yes.

79

s
^ ^ f r l i r * ^ ' * ""/Cite as <*'^'/rl\ft\ \/$ V%
V * 7-*' *'/ 110 Utah Adv. Rep. 12 ^fjiVJ *

Mutual counterclaimed, contending that it had
been * constructively ''evicted by the Reids*
failure to control the activities of IntermounV:,j£ IN THE SUPREME COURT, Jtti tain/* While the litigation was proceeding, the
ffi4 OFTHE STATE OF UTAH^vjA/, Reids "remodeled the premises at issue and
leased them to Intermountain for the remaiMerrin R. REID and Ethna R. Reid,
t^lfrh\ nder of the five-year term at a rate comparable v to < what Mutual had been ' paying.
However, in November of 1982, IntermounMUTUAL OF OMAHA INSURANCE,;^ ,.\f< tain vacated and declared bankruptcy} from
COMPANY and United Benefit L i f e ; ^ -4|,jrj' that point through the date of -trial, the pre'
•A
' '' *
Insurance Company, j ^ , * , ,y t ^ ^ f t u ^ ' ' * mises were left vacant.' •"'
[^Defendants : and Appellants./ ^ V , ^ \ t f ^ * A bench trial was held in July of 1983.
After ' hearing extensive r evidence, the court
r
No. 19678, * , .» - ^ ,f - 4 ^ ? ^ 7r*VV> found against Mutual on its counterclaim for
FILED: June 12, l ^ g / ^ l H ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ M , ; ; , * constructive eviction, concluding that the noisy
'
'•
*• *
'
conditions were not sufficiently disruptive to
Third District, Salt Lake County tw^vf*^ <V* amount to a constructive eviction.'The court
Honorable Peter f\Leary ^ ; , ^ ' t ' l j ; C ^ - , ^ found that Mutual had breached the lease
ATTORNEYS: ^\JS *>V* M^V&J / ^ J I ^ agreement vand awarded the' Reids damages
under the terms of the agreement. f These
Jack LJ Schoenhals, Salt I^akeCity, for >*r*!n
consisted
of the total of the unpaid rents,
appellants;,;; •% * K : *
^{"fity^1'*'. including both those that had accrued through
T
Reid Tateoka, Salt Lake,City, ,for appellees \ 4 the date of trial and those that would accrue
from the date of trial through the end of the
r ^This opinion is subject to revision before V
lease term in 1985, less rents actually received
publication in the Pacific Reporter. «*. ' / from Intermountain during the time it occupied the Mutual premises,' plus the costs of
ZIMMERMAN, Justice: *•}'•;&*« Jf^l*]'"***
reletting and attorney fees.1
Mutual of Omaha ("Mutual") appeals from
" Before this Court, Mutual attacks the trial
a judgment in a nonjury trial finding it liable court's failure to find for it on the constructo Mervin and Ethna Reid ("the Reids") for tive eviction counterclaim. In the event that
breach of a lease»for office space.. Mutual challenge fails, Mutual contends that the trial
contends that the trial court erred in rejecting court erred in calculating the damages due
its claim that the • Reids had constructively from it to the Reids.
evicted Mutual and,that it also erred in calcMutual's attack on the trial court's constulating the damages due the Reids. We affirm
ructive eviction ruling has two prongs. First, it
the, judgments of liability .for breach of the
contends that the trial court's findings of fact
lease but reverse in partr on the{ determination
regarding the disruptiveness of Intermounof damages.
. l\ * , * ? . ; \ v » "
tain's behavior are inadequate to support its
In September of 1980, Mutual, as tenant, legal conclusion because they lack the necesand the Reids, as landlord, entered a five- sary specificity. Second, Mutual claims that
year lease agreement for office space at a the trial court's findings and its resulting
monthly rate of $1,100. The lease term was to conclusion that a constructive eviction had not
end in October of 1985. Mutual took possesoccurred lack evidentiary support.
sion of the premises, which it used to conduct
We first address the challenge to the specian insurance sales business. Soon afterward,
another tenant moved into adjoining space in ficity of the findings of fact. Rule 52(a) of the
the building. The other tenant, Intermountain Utah Rules of Civil Procedure requires the
Marketing ("Intermountain"), operated a door- judge in a bench trial to "find the facts specto-door cookware sales business and used its ially and state separately its conclusions of law
office space to train its large sales force. thereon." Utah R. Civ, P. 52(a). The failure
Mutual made numerous complaints to the to enter adequate findings of fact on material
Reids that Intermountain*s personnel were issues may be reversible error. See, e.g., Acton
excessively noisy, occupied all of MutuaPs v. J.B. Deliran, Corp., 737 P.2d 996, 999
parking spaces, and otherwise interfered with (Utah 1987). The findings must be articulated
Mutuai's business. Mutual felt that the Reids with sufficient detail so that the basis of thedid not respond adequately to the frequent ultimate conclusion can be understood. See,
complaints and, in February of 1982, gave e.g., id. at 999; Smith v. Smith, 726 P.2d 423,
notice and vacated the premises. In April of 426 (Utah 1986); Rucker v. Dalton, 598 P.2d
1336,1338-39 (Utah 1979).
1982, the Reids filed suit, claiming that
Here, although the Findings of fact entered
Mutual had breached the lease and was liable
for the monthly rental for the three and a half by the trial court are not a model of clarity,
we conclude that they are adequate. The findings satisfactorily express the trial court's
UTAH

CE REPORTS

CODE •co
Provo, Utah

Reid v. Mutual of Oms a Insurance Company
110 Utah /

determination as to the nature of the activities
carried on by Intermountain in' the space
adjacent to Mutual's and its determination
that the noise and other annoyances were not
so egregious as to render the premises unsuitable for their intended use, as is required for a
claim of constructive eviction. See, e.g., Brugget v. Fonoti, 645 P.2d 647, 648» (Utah
1982); see generallyA Backman, LandlordTenant Law: A Perspective on < Reform in
Utah, 1981 Utah U Rev. 727, 740 [hereinafter
Backman, 1981 Utah L. Rev.]; 2 R. Powell, The
Law of Real Property,
Landlord
and
Tenant Estates, 1232 (1988). The findings are
also sufficiently detailed to reveal the trial
court's reasoning processes. Therefore, the
findings meet the requirements of rule 52(a). ,
We next address Mutual's claim. that the
findings and the resulting conclusion that there
was no constructive eviction are not adequately supported by the evidence.. To mount a
successful challenge to the correctness of a
trial court's findings of fact, an appellant
must first marshal all the evidence supporting
the finding and then demonstrate that i the
evidence is legally insufficient to support the
findings even in viewing it in the light most
favorable to the court below. In re Estate of
Bartell, 105 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (March 28,
1989) (mem. op.); State v. Mitchell, 103 Utah
Adv. Rep. 13 (March 2, 1989); Scharfv. BMG
Corp., 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985). The
legal sufficiency of the evidence is determined
by the standard set out in civil rule 52(a),
which provides: "Findings of fact, whether
based on oral or documentary evidence, shall
not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and
due regard shall be given to the opportunity of
the trial court to judge the credibility of the
witnesses." Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a). - This
"clearly erroneous" standard applies whether
the case is characterized as one in equity or
one in law. See Barker v. Francis, 741 P.2d
548, 551 (Utah Ct. App. 1987); see also Ashton
v. Ashton, > 733 P.2d • 147, 150 and n.l
(Utah 1987). A finding attacked as lacking
adequate evidentiary support is deemed
"clearly erroneous" only if we conclude that
the finding is against the clear weight of the
evidence. In re Estate of Bartell, State v. Mitchell, see Western Kane County Special
Serv. Dist. No. 1 v. Jackson Cattle Co., 744
P.2d 1376, 1377 (Utah 1987); Stare v. Walker,
743 P.2d 191,192-93 (Utah 1987).
-> Here, the * evidence * provides adequate
support for the findings. We certainly cannot
say that they are against the clear weight of
the evidence, especially when we give "due
regard" to the trial court's opportunity to
assess the credibility of the numerous witnesses
called by each party. Because the court's
conclusion of law on the constructive eviction
issue is fully supported by these findings,
Mutual's arguments on this issue are rejected,
and we affirm the determination that Mutual

v. Rep 12

_
l£

breached the lease agreement by vacating the
premises and failing to pay rent after February
of 1982.
Mutual next argues that even if the trial
court properly rejected its constructive eviction
claim and found it to have breached the lease,
the Reids were entitled only to damages for
nonpayment of rents measured by those rents
that came due between the date of Mutual's
last payment and the date of the reletting to
Intermountain. Mutual contends that the trial
court erred when it included in the measure of
damages the unpaid rents that accrued after
this reletting.
In support of this argument, Mutual relies
upon the common law doctrine of "surrender
and acceptance." Under that doctrine, when a
tenant surrenders the premises to a landlord
before a lease term expires and the' landlord
accepts that surrender, the tenant is no longer
in privity of estate with the landlord and therefore has no obligation to pay any rents
accruing after the date of the acceptance. See,
e.g., Frisco Joes, Inc. v. Peay, 558 P.2d 1327,
1330 (Utah 1977); Willis v. Kronendonk, 58
Utah 592, 597-98, 200 P, 1025, 1027-28
(1921). See generally Backman, 1981 Utah L.
Rev. at 737-39; 49 Am. Jur/ 2d Landlord
and Tenant §§619-25 (1970);.^ American
Law of Property §3.99 (Casner' 1952); Restatement (Second) of Property, §12.1 (1977).
Phrased in contract law parlance, the lease is
treated as having been rescinded or terminated
by mutual agreement.2 Sec Humbach, The
Common-Law Conception of Leasing: Mitigation, Habitability, and *• Dependence of
Covenants, 60 Wash.*U.L.Q. 1213, 1237-41
(1983). Mutual contends that this common law
doctrine was applicable under the terms of the
lease agreement. It then argues that the Reids'
actions in remodeling the premises and reletting them to Intermountain amounted to an
acceptance of surrender that relieved Mutual
of its obligation to pay further rents. , <
* *?
At common law,, the critical issue in applying the doctrine of surrender and acceptance
is determining whether the landlord intended
to accept the surrender. This intention may be
express or implied. See Frisco Joe's, 558 P.2d
at 1330; Mariani Air Prods. Co. v. Gill's Tire
Mkt., 29 Utah 2d 291, 293, 508 P.2d 808, 810
(1973); Belanger v.< Rice, 2 Utah 2d 250, 272
P.2d 173 (1954) 2 R. Powell, The Law of Real
Property, 124911) (1988). The lease agreement
between the Reids and Mutual deals specifically with the question'of how the functional
equivalent of an intent to accept a surrender,
denominated an "election by Landlord to
terminate this Lease," would be manifested.
Paragraph 19 of the lease agreement states in
part:$

UTAH ADVANCE

If Tenant shall make default in
the payment of the rent reserved ...
or if the leased premises ... shall be

abandoned ror vacated*»i..»uthen
Landlord, in addition«to any other
rights or remedies it may have, shall
have the immediate right * of reentry
Landlord may elect to reenter, as herein provided, or Landlord may take possession pursuant
to this Lease and relet said premises
..".I*' No such ' re-entry ' or' taking
possession of the premises by Lan*
dlord shall be construed as an election by Landlord to terminate this
Lease unless the termination thereof
be decreed by a court of competent
jurisdiction or stated specifically by
the Landlord in writing* addressed
to Tenant/* Notwithstanding any
such reletting without termination,
Landlord may • at any time thereafter elect to terminate this Lease for
such previous breach.
(Emphasis added.)

burden of marshalling the supporting evidence
and then demonstrating that the trial court's
finding on this point lacks adequate record
support under the r "clearly erroneous" standard. In re Estate of Bartell; State v. Mitchell;
Scharff100 P.2d at 1070. We conclude that
Mutual has not met that burden. Our previous
cases • have held that conduct such as the
Reids'—reentering, remodeling, and reletting the premises-is r relevant to, but not
conclusive evidence of, an intent to accept the
surrendered premises and terminate the lease.3
See John C. Cutler Ass'n v. DeJay Stores,
Inc., 3 Utah 2d at 111-12, 279 P.2d at 70203. We affirm the trial court's finding that the
Reids'' conduct was a reletting witliout termination.

Mutual next contends that even if it was
liable for some rents accruing after the premises had been relet, the trial court erred in
fixing the amount. This argument has several
subparts, each of which attacks different parts
The lease thus provided for two means of of the damage award. To put Mutual's contproving an election by the landlord to termi- entions in context, a brief review of the
nate: a written notice from the landlord or a court's damage award is appropriate.
Shortly after Mutual's vacation of the predecree by a court. It is undisputed that the
Reids did not elect to terminate the lease (or in mises, the Reids reached an agreement with
common law terminology, accept fne surre- Intermountain to take over the vacated space.
nder) by means'of a writing addressed to The premises were remodeled to meet InterMutual. But Mutual argues that the language mountain's needs, and Intermountain took
referring to a termination of the lease "decreed possession under an agreement to remain in
by a court" should be read to mean that a possession through the end of Mutual's full
termination has occurred if a court, applying term in October of 1985 at the same $1,100
the common law rules for determining the per month that Mutual had agreed to pay.
landlord's intentions from its actions, concl- However, Intermountain paid rent only until
udes that there has been an acceptance of a November of 1982, when it defaulted and
surrender. Mutual then argues that the trial vacated all of its rented space. The trial court
court erred when it failed to decree that the held that under the terms of the lease, Mutual
Reids* conduct constituted an, acceptance of was liable for all rents accruing from4 the date
of its breach until the date of trial, less any
surrender that terminated the lease.
We need not decide whether the language of amounts actually received from Intermountain
the lease effectively incorporated the common plus the costs of remodeling to meet Intermlaw surrender and acceptance • doctrine, - as ountain's specifications, as well as attorney
Mutual argues, nor need we address the extent fees and court costs. The trial court also
to which the doctrine should be given contin- addressed liability for rents accruing after the
uing vitality in modern landlord-tenant rel- date of the trial. It awarded the Reids an
ationships. For even if that doctrine did apply, amount equal to the total of all rents that
would have come due under the terms of the
its requirements are not satisfied here.
. At common law, a tenant raising the affir- lease from the trial date through the end of
mative defense of surrender and acceptance the original lease term in October of 1985,
has the burden of proving the landlord's some twenty-four months later less any
intent to accept the surrender. See Mariani Air amounts the Reids might realize from future
premises for any part of the
Prods. Co., 29 Utah 2d at 293, 508 P.2d at reletting of the
5
810; John C. Cutler Ass'n v. Dejay Stores, original term.
Mutual first contends that the trial court
Inc., 3 Utah 2d 107, 110, 279 P.2d 700, 702
(1955). And the determination of the land- erred in requiring it to pay the Reids an
lord's * intention is a question of fact. See amount that represents the rents that IntermMariani Air Prods., 29 Utah at 293, 508 P.2d ountain had agreed to pay but did not actually
at 810. Here, then, when the trial court found pay for the space vacated by Mutual. Second,
that the Reids' actions amounted to a reentry Mutual claims that the court erred by incluand "reletting without termination," it effect- ding in the damage measure future rents that
ively determined that Mutual had not met its would accrue from the date of trial through
burden of proof1 on the factual question of the end of the term without expressly requiring
intent. Therefore, on appeal Mutual has the the Reids to mitigate their post-trial damages
by taking reasonable steps to find other
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tenants to occupy the premises for the remainder of the term.
With respect to Mutual's first claim, it
-concedes that the trial court properly awarded
damages for rents accruing between the time it
vacated and the time the premises were relet to
Intermountain. However, Mutual argues that
after the premises had been relet, paragraph
19 of the lease agreement limited the Reids'
damages to the difference between the rent
reserved for the months remaining under the
Mutual-Reid lease and the rent the new
tenant agreed to pay, rather than the amount ac*
tually paid by the new tenant.
This argument is utterly without merit.
Paragraph 19 states in part:
Landlord may elect to re-enter as
herein provided, or Landlord may
take possession pursuant to this
Lease artd relet said premises or any
part thereof for such term or terms
... and at such rental or rentals and
upon such other terms and conditions as Landlord in the exercise of
Landlord's sole discretion may
deem advisable with the right to
make alterations and repairs to said
premises. Upon each such reletting,
Tenant shall be immediately liable,
for and shall pay to Landlord, in
addition to any indebtedness due
hereunder, the costs and expenses
of such reletting including advertising costs, brokerage fees, any
reasonable attorney's fees incurred
and the cost of such alterations and
repairs incurred by Landlord, and
the amount, if any, by which the
rent reserved in this Lease for the
period of such reletting (up to but
not beyond the term of this Lease)
exceeds the amount agreed to be
paid as rent for the premises for
said period by such reletting. / /
Tenant has been credited with any
rent to be received by such reletting
and such rents shall not be promptly paid to Landlord by the new
Tenant, such deficiency shall be
calculated and paid monthly by
Tenant.
(Emphasis added.) The emphasized language
clearly provides that Mutual was to be responsible for any amounts not actually paid by
the new tenant. In effect, Mutual had agreed
to serve as an insurer against the default of
the new tenant, and the trial court merely
enforced that agreement as written
Mutual's second challenge relates to that
portion of the award dealing with rents that
were to accrue between the date of trial and
the end of the original lease term. Mutual
contends that the judgment entered fails to
ensure that the Reids would mitigate their
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damages by reletting the premises.
We are thus faced with the question of
whether Utah law imposes a duty upon landlords to mitigate their damages by reletting
premises after a tenant has wrongfully vacated
and defaulted on the covenant to pay rent.
There is no controlling statute,7 and our research has revealed no case in which we have
directly addressed the question. See Survey of
Utah Law, 1965 Utah L. t Rev. 770, 771.
However, the concept of landlords mitigating
their damages by reletting has been mentioned
in several cases where the doctrine of surrender and acceptance was at issue.1 In those
cases, the Court spoke favorably of, at a
minimum, allowing landlords to mitigate by
reletting without the risk that such mitigation
efforts would be treated as an acceptance of
surrender. See, e.g., Meyer v. Evans, 16 Utah
2d 56, 57, 395 P.2d 726, 727 (1964); John C.
Cutler Ass'n, 3 Utah 2d at 111, 279 P.2d at
702; Belanger v. Rice, 2 Utah 2d at 252, 272
P.2datl74.
In looking to the law of other jurisdictions,
we find a split of authority on the question. In
states following what has been described as the
traditional rule, landlords are not required to
mitigate by reletting. See Restatement (Second)
of Property §12.1(3) (1977); 49 Am. Jur. 2d
Landlord and Tenant §621 (1970). A number
of states have recently reconsidered the traditional view and, following what has been
termed a trend rule, have imposed by statute
or judicial decision some obligation to relet.
See, e.g., Schneiker'v. Gordon, 732 P.2d 603
(Colo. 1987); Sommer v. Kridel, 74 N.J. 446,,
378 A.2d 767 (1977). See generally 2 R.
Powell,, The Law of Real Property, 1249[2]
(1988); Note, Illinois Landlords' New Statutory Duty to Mitigate Damages: 111. Rev. Stat.
Ch. 110, §9-213.1, 34 DePaul L. Rev. 1033
(1985) [hereinafter Illinois Landlords' Duty,
34 DePaul L. Rev.]; I American Law of Property §3.99 (Casner 1952); 52 C.J.S. Landlord and Tenant §498 (1968); Backman, 1981
Utah L. Rev., at 728-34; Annotation, Landlord's Duty, on Tenant's Failure to Occupy,
or Abandonment of Premises, to Mitigate
Damages by Accepting or Procuring Another
Tenant, 21 A.L.R.3d 534 (1968) [hereinafter
Annotation, 21 A.L.R. 3d]. These two com;
peting rules reflect an evolution in the underlying doctrinal approach that has begun to
have an impact on many issues of landlordtenant law. As commentators have noted, the
traditional rule imposing no duty to mitigate
has its roots in ancient property law concepts
under which leaseholds are considered estates
in land. The trend rule reflects the more
modern view that leases are essentially commercial transactions, contractual in nature. See
Kwall, Retained Jurisdiction <• in Damage
Actions Based on Anticipatory Breach: A
Missing Link in Landlord - Tenant Law, 37
Case • W. Res. L> Rev. 273, 274 (1986)
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*< A number of justifications have been advanced in support of the traditional rule. One is
that forcing a landlord to mitigate is unfair
when ' the" conduct "'constituting * mitigation
might be viewed as evidence of an acceptance
of a surrender, a result not actually in accordance with the landlord's intentions. Another
justification is equitable in nature: it is unfair
to allow the breaching'tenant to force'on the
innocent landlord an affirmative duty to seek
out new tenants and perhaps let the premises
to tenants "not entirely suitable in the landlord's subjective view. A final ground offered
for retaining the traditional rule is simply that
it is of long standing and in conformance with
underlying property law notions. See generally
21 A>L.R.3d at 548-49.

inconsistent witn tnis concept or a lease to
impose upon the landlord, who has no interest
in the property during the lease term, the
obligation to relet the property for the remainder of that term. See Welcome v. Hess, 90
Cal. 507, •!_; 27 P. 369, 371 (1891); Gruman
v. Investors Diversified Servs.l Inc., 247 Minn.
5 0 2 / 5 0 6 - 0 7 / 7 8 N.W.2d 377, 380 (1956).
Today,'leases are generally viewed as commercial ' transactions in which the landlord
retains' the 'estate but permits its use by
another on specified conditions; leases are
seldom seen as complete conveyances of the
underlying property for a specified term. Our
unlawful detainer statutes sub silentio recognize this changed view of a landlord's retained
interest in the property when they authorize a
The first of these justifications for the tra- landlord to evict a breaching tenant and
ditional rule can be easily obviated. As already reenter and relet the premises in very short
noted, there is no reason to permit mitigating order. See Utah Code Ann. §§78-36-8.5,conduct to be used as indicia of an intent to 12,-12.6(1987).
In sum, the principal justifications given to
accept a surrender* See supra note 3. As for
the second, there is some * validity-to the support the traditional rule are to a large
concern that the breaching party should not be extent anachronistic. In contrast, we find
able to force its landlord to seek other tenants persuasive the reasons advanced in support of
on ' pain ' of losing? bargained-for rents.1 the trend rule requiring the landlord to take
However, we think this point is outweighed by steps to mitigate its losses. For example, the
the policy arguments in favor of the modern economies of both the state and the nation
rule, and we think any unfairness to the lan- benefit from a rule that encourages the reletdlord can ~ largely be eliminated by careful ting of premises, which returns them to proapplication * of ' a rule « requiring reasonable ductive use, rather than permitting a landlord
to let them sit idle while it seeks rents from
mitigation efforts only.
As for the final justification offered for the the breaching tenant. See Schneiker v. Gordon,
traditional rule, it is true that that rule reflects 732 P.2d at 610; Illinois Landlords' Duty, 34
ancient property law concepts; however, those DePaul L. Rev. at 1033, 1040, 1064; and
concepts! themselves are no longer consonant Beckman, Duty of Commercial Landlords to
with most J modern landlord-tenant relation- Mitigate: Some Thoughts on Darpar Associships.* First, the ancient law of leaseholds was ates, 55 Conn. B.J. 339, 345 (1981).
In addition, the trend rule is more in
developed in the ,context of leases of agricultural land. Those leases generally ran from keeping with the current policy disfavoring
growing season to growing season. If a tenant contractual penalties. Damages recoverable
vacated after planting time had passed, it was under a liquidated damages provision in a
unrealistic to expect the landlord to find a new contract will generally be limited to an amount
tenant interested in leasing land that was ess- that represents a reasonable estimation, made
entially useless for the remainder of the term. at the time the contract was drafted, of what
Cf. Utah 'Code 'Ann. §78-36-4 (1987) would be necessary to compensate the nonbr(statute allows agricultural land tenant to hold eaching party for losses caused by the breach.
over for another year when landlord fails to This policy is based on the view that any liqobject within 60 days to tenant's remaining in uidated damages provision not so limited
possession following lease term expiration). results in the imposition of a penalty on the
Therefore, a rule requiring mitigation by rel- breaching party that is not permitted. See
etting would have been highly artificial in the Warner v. Rasmussen, 704 P.2d 559, 561, 563
practical context of most landlord-tenant (Utah 1985); Water Implement, Inc. v. Focht,
relationships.' But today, agricultural leases 107 Wash. 2d 553, 558-59, 730 P.2d 1340,
constitute only*a minor part of the modern 1343-44 (1987). Similarly, allowing a landleasing market. Growing seasons are irrelevant lord to leave property idle when it could be
to ' the ' leasing of residential premises and profitably leased and force an absent tenant to
commercial buildings. Second, the traditional pay rent for that idled property permits the
rule also stems from the ancient concept that a landlord to recover more damages than it may
leasehold is*a complete conveyance of a real reasonably require to be compensated for the
property interest such that the tenant becomes, tenant's breach. This is analogous to imposing
for a defined term of years, the owner of the a disfavored penalty upon the tenant.
Finally, the trend rule is more in line with
property and the landlord simply has no
present 'ownership interest in the property the policy favoring mitigation that we have
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adopted in other areas of the law. For
example, mitigation is generally required when
damages are sought in tort cases, as well as in
contract cases. xSee, »e.g., Angelos v., First
Interstate Bank,x61l P.2d at 777; Jankele v.
Texas Co., 88 Utah 325, 332-33, 54 P.2d
425, 428 (1936); see also Restatement (Second)
of Torts §918(1) (1979).
In light of these considerations, we conclude
that a mitigation requirement is generally
appropriate in the context of modern landlordtenant transactions, and we join those courts
now following the trend rule described above.
We hold that a landlord who seeks to hold a
breaching tenant liable for unpaid rents has an
obligation to take, commercially reasonable
steps to mitigate its losses, which ordinarily
means that the landlord must seek to relet the
premises.
Certain aspects of our holding require some
elaboration. Because a landlord may occasionally bring an action for unpaid rents and
other , amounts due • before the lease term
expires, as happened here, it is appropriate
that we spell out how the mitigation obligation
is to be handled, both as to past due and
future accruing rents. If the trial of the landlord's action occurs after the end of the lease
term and the tenant is found to have breached
the lease agreement, the landlord then has the
burden of proving , both 1 the- amount of
damages and the fact that it took appropriate
mitigation efforts. Assuming the landlord
carries this burden, a judgment and damage
award on the whole cause arising out of the
breach can then be rendered. However, 4if the
trial occurs before the end of the lease term, a
judgment cannot be entered for rents that
have not yet accrued; any damage award must
be limited to taking account only of rents that
h*ve accrued as of the trial date. To recover
for later accruing rents, the landlord. must
bring a supplemental proceeding or proceedings in which it can prove that additional rents
have accrued and that reasonable efforts to
mitigate those losses have been taken.
Another point warranting clarification is the
affirmative nature of the mitigation obligation. Some courts imposing a mitigation requirement do not require landlords to show
active efforts to, relet; instead, the t landlord
can carry its T proof-of-mitigation ( burden
simply by showing that it was passively receptive to opportunities to relet the premises. See
Reget v. Dempsey-Tegeler & Co., 96 111.
App. 2d 278, 281, 238 N.E.2d 418, 419 (1968).
We conclude that this minimal showing does
not serve the policies that underlie, the adoption of a mitigation requirement. We prefer to
follow those courts that have required that the
landlord take positive steps reasonably calculated to effect a reletting of the premises. See
Butler Products Co* v. Roush, 153 Ariz. 500,
503, 738 P.2d 775, 778 (1987); Schneiker v,
GordQn, 732 P.2d at 611; Olsen v. Country
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Club Sports,, Inc.', 110 Idaho 789,^794-95,
718 P.2d 1227, 1232-33 (Idaho CV App.
1985); Wichita Properties' v. Lanterman, 6
Kan. App. 2d 656, _ , ' 6 3 3 P.2d 1154, J157-"
58 (1981); Jefferson Dev. Co. v.r Heritage
Cleaners, J 0 9 Mich. App. 606,. 611, , 311
N.W.2d 426, 428 (1981); Isbey v. Crews, 57
N.C. App. 47, 51, 284 S.E.2d 534, 537 (1981);
United States Natl Bank v. Homeland, Inc.,
291 Or. 374, 378-82, 631 P.2d 761,^763-65 "
(1981). Cf. > Illinois Landlords9 Duty,( 34
DePaul L. Rev. at 1044 n.77 (listing state
statutes imposing mitigation duty«on landlords). Only by following such a course can we
ensure that serious efforts are made to redeploy 4 the • rental property ; in a productive
fashion by those who are best able to accomplish that end and who are also best able to
prove that required mitigation efforts have
been carried out,*
A further word about the standard by which
a landlord's s efforts to mitigate are to r be
measured: the standard is one of objective
commercial i reasonableness. See i Olsen v.
Country Club Sports, Inc., 110 Idaho at 794,
718 P.2d at 1232. A landlord is obligated to
take such steps as would be expected of a
reasonable landlord letting out a similar property in the same market conditions.,See Illinois Landlords' Duty, 34 DePaul L. Rev. at
1046-50. Obviously,, the objective commercial
reasonableness of mitigation efforts is a fact
question that depends heavily on the particularities of the property and the relevant market
at the pertinent point in time. See Jefferson
Dev. Co., ,.109 Mich. .App. at 611-13^311
N.W.2d at 428-29; United States Nat'l Bank,
291 Or. at 379-84, 631 P.2d l att>764-67;
Berkman, 55 Conn. B.J. at 351-53.
Since we have imposed on the landlord an
affirmative obligation to seek a new tenant, it
is appropriate that costs reasonably incurred in
readying the property and in reletting or attempting to relet be added to the amount recoverable from the breaching tenant. See, e.g.,
Richard v. Broussard, 495 So.* 2d 1291, 1293
(La. 1986). Such costs may include,not only
expenses incurred in seeking new tenants, but
also costs of repairs or alterations of the premises reasonably necessary to successfully relet
them. See Illinois Landlords' Duty, 34 DePaul
L. Rev. at 1059. As in the present case, it is
not uncommon, for property, particularly
commercial property, to be modified to meet
the n»^eds of a new tenant. So long as the
expenses incurred in the process of reletting,
or attempting to relet the property are commercially reasonable, they should be borne by
the breaching tenant. See Illinois Landlords'
Duty, 34 DePaul L. Rev. at 1058-61. * »
,^
Finally,,our ruling that damage awards must
take into account only, those rents that have
actually accrued as of the time of trial deserves explanation. If the trial is held after the
lease term has expired, it is a relatively simple
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matter to assess the landlord's * recoverable sents the present value of the amount by
losses by taking into account the degree to which the total of the future rents due under
which the landlord k has " fulfilled its duty' to the lease exceeds the fair market rental value
mitigate. However,' when the term has not of the premises over the \same period. See
expired by the time of trial, it is impossible to I Speedee Mart, Inc. v. Stovall, 664 S.W.2d
evaluate the adequacy of the mitigation efforts 174, 177 (Tex. Ct. App. 1983); Kwall, 37 Case
the landlord will have to make in the future W. Res. L. Rev. at 279-91; 2 R. Powell, The
with respect to rents that have not yet come Law of Real Property 1249[1], at 17-65
due, and it is equally impossible to determine (1988), This permits an immediate resolution
whether those efforts will be successfulJ in of the damage issue without placing the lanreducing losses from future accruing rents. dlord at risk of not being able to successfully
Some means must be devised to permit reco- prosecute further actions against the tenant for
very of actual lossesJ occasioned by future the future accruing rents. And it serves the
accruing rents while ensuring that the landlord 'policies of the mitigation rule because, at least
fulfills its duty to mitigate losses.
in theory, the incentive to mitigate is built into
Commentators have described three basic the measure of damages. By limiting the
approaches to this problem of accounting for damages to the difference between the rents
rental obligations accruing after the date of due and the fair market rental value of the
t r i a l . / T h e y are the multiple-cause-of- premises, this approach attempts to take into
action rule, the anticipatory-breach doctrine, account the amount the landlord will be able
and the rctainedjurisdiction 'concept* We j to realize by reasonable efforts to relet.
conclude that only one of these approaches,
We conclude that the anticipatory-breach
that of retained jurisdiction, adequately acc- approach does not go far enough in avoiding
ommodates the values we judge to be impor- the problem of Speculative damages. It requtant in fashioning a remedy,
ires a trial court to award what amounts to
<r
,The first of these approaches to the problem speculative damages because the damages are
is labeled the multiple-cause-of-action to be based on projections as to the future fair
approach. Under it, the landlord can recover I market rental value of the premises througonly those rents that have accrued through the ( hout the term of the lease, which may be for
time of trial. Once a judgment is entered, the years. Such projections also will inevitably be
case is closed and the court's jurisdiction over imperfect in accounting for the landlord's real
the parties and * subject matter ' ends*' To success at reletting the premises.10 Thus, this
recover additional rents that may accrue after approach sacrifices too much to uncertainty
trial, the landlord must initiate a new suit* See for both the landlord and the tenant in the
Kwall, 37 Case W. Res. L. 1 Rev. at 274- interest of achieving a quick resolution. We
75. The justification offered for this approach conclude that such a trade-off is unnecessary
is that it enables courts to avoid the awarding in light of the availability of a better approf uncertain or speculative future damages. See oach.
Frankel vc United States, 321 F. Supp.
The third approach, and the one we adopt,
1331, 1340-41 (E.D. Pa. 1970), aff'd sub. is that of retained jurisdiction. This approach,
nom/, Frankel v. Heymf 466 F.2d 1226 (3d like the multiplecourse-of-action approach,
Cir/1972). It also ensures that the landlord's allows the landlord to obtain a judgment soon
mitigation efforts are all in the past and can after the tenant's breach; but rather than
be fully evaluated.'
requiring the institution of an entirely new suit
We find this approach unsatisfactory since it (or suits) to collect future rents, it permits the
requires a landlord to either forego expected court to retain jurisdiction over the parties and
periodic rental payments and bring suit for a the subject matter and enter new damage
lump sum at the end of the lease term or awards as additional rents accrue. See Kwall,
undertake the l expenses and difficulties of 37 Case W. Res. L. Rev. at 328-38. And,
bringingl several separate claims over the unlike the anticipatory-breach approach, this
length of the term. With either choice, the approach does not depend on speculative
landlord risks having the tenant leave the projections of future events that may lead to
under- or overestimation of a landlord's
court's geographical jurisdiction.
K
A number of courts have sought to avoid losses. Damage awards will be based on past
the problems of the multiple-cause-of- events only and will take into account the
action approach by following one of the two landlord's fnitigation efforts. This approach,
other approaches. The first is to apply to therefore, should provide an incentive to the
leases the contract doctrine of anticipatory landlord to see that its mitigation duty is ful
breach. See generally Restatement (Second) of filled, lest it be denied some of the damages it
Contracts §§250-57 (1981); A. Corbin, Corbin would otherwise be entitled to.
'The retained jurisdiction approach should
on Contracts, ] §959 " (1964). ' Under this
approach, the landlord can bring suit prior to be implemented as follows: When a landlord's
the expiration of the lease term and obtain a action for breach of a lease is tried before the
recovery that ' includes not only already expiration of the lease term and the finder of
accrued rents, but also an amount that repre- fact \determines that the tenant has breached
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the lease, the amount awarded should represent only those rents that have come due as of
the time of trial. This judgment will be immediately enforceable. Rents accruing after the
trial, on the other hand, may be recovered
through what will amount to rather brief
supplemental proceedings. To provide this
remedy, the trial court should retain jurisdiction of the underlying action.11 After, additional unpaid rents have accrued, the landlord
may return to the court, without the risks and
burdens that attend the filing of a new action,
for a simple determination of additional losses
suffered through the date of the supplemental
proceedings and whether the landlord has
fulfilled its ongoing duty to mitigate. Under
the law-of-the-case doctrine, the initial
determination of the tenant's liability would
govern in any supplemental proceedings. See,
Sittner v. Big Horn Tar Sand & Oil, Inc., 692
P.2d 735, 736 (Utah 1984); 46 Am. Jur. 2d
Judgments §400 (1969).
As Professor Kwall has' observed, the
concept of retained jurisdiction has been used
effectively in other areas of the law where a
fair resolution of the matter requires that a
mechanism be available for accommodating
future developments. Examples- include divorce
adjudications, probate matters, providing for
specific enforcement of certain long-term
contracts other - than realty / leases, and
workers' compensation matters. Kwall, 37
Case W. Res. L. Rev. at 291-328- It should
be equally effective in the lease context and is
well worth the minimal additional burden it
may impose on the parties. See Kwall, 37 Case
W. Res. L. Rev. at 328-38.
Applying the retained-jurisdiction approach to the present case requires a vacation of
part of the judgment and a remand for further
proceedings. The trial court found that the
Reids had mitigated their damages through the
time of trial. We have affirmed that finding
and therefore affirm the judgment to the
extent that it is based on rents that accrued
through the date of trial. The second part of
the court's order, however, apparently
awarded the Reids damages for rents that
accrued after the trial, without imposing on
the Reids a continuing affirmative duty to
mitigate these subsequently accruing losses.
Therefore, that portion of the judgment must
be reversed. However, since the trial court
continues to have jurisdiction over the case
insofar as it relates to rents accruing after
trial, the Reids are free to return to the court
and reduce to judgment additional damages
they may have incurred as a result of rents
accruing over the remainder ' of the' nowexpired term or additional costs they incurred
as a result of their efforts to mitigate. Of
course, the Reids must prove at such a proceeding that they have fulfilled their,ongoing
duty to mitigate.* '
i ** 4 J; » ^ } < i "
Finally, the Reids request an award of att-
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orney fees incurred in connection with this
appeal. Such an award appears to be within
the contemplation of the lease agreement. We
therefore remand the matter to the trial court
for consideration of an award of such fees and
costs. See Cottonwood Mall Co. v. Sine, 767
P.2d 499,503 (Utah 1988).
WE CONCUR:
Gordon R. Hall, Chief Justice
Christine M. Durham* Justice
1. The judgment also included other minor amounts
provided for under specific provisions of the agreement. Those amounts are not in controversy on this
appeal, and we do not address them.
2. Some courts and commentators have taken the
view that because a lease agreement is both a conveyance of land apd a contract, the consequences of
a surrender and acceptance must be viewed differe?
ntly from either solely a contract law or a property
law , perspective. For example, the Colorado
Supreme Court recently expressed the view that
while an acceptance of surrender does terminate all
obligation for future rents as a matter of property
law, it leaves intact the contractual obligation to pay
such rents. Because the landlord and tenant remain
in privity of contract, although not in privity of
estate, the landlord accepting a surrender can still
"maintain an action for contract damages caused by
the tenant's breach of the lease." Schneiker v.
Gordon,- 732 P.2d 603, 608 (Colo. 1987). Although
the Colorado court did not expressly so state, we
assume it would still allow for a complete termination of the lease relationship by means of a rescission. Our view is that the property and/or contract
relationship between the parties can be effectively
terminated by words or conduct that sufficiently
demonstrates an intent to do so.
3. As we explain in the latter part of this opinion,
lessors in the Reids' position have what effectively
amounts to an obligation to mitigate damages by
seeking to relet the premises. That duty to mitigate,
which reflects general principles of contract law, was
not expressly considered in our older cases in which
reletting was viewed as relevant, although not conclusive, evidence of the acceptance of surrender.
Our ruling today requires a revaluation of those
cases. Because we now hold that there is a duty to
relet, it follows that it would be unfair and inappropriate to treat such reletting alone as sufficient
evidence to show that the landlord intended to
accept a surrender of the premises and free the
tenanti from all obligation for future rents. See
Humbach, The CommonLaw
Conception
of
Leasing: Mitigating Habttabihty, and Dependence of
Covenants, 60 Wash. U.L.Q., 1213, 1240-56 (1983)
[hereinafter Humbach, 60 Wash. U.L.Q.J.
' We also note that the question of how an acceptance of surrender is manifested, as well as the
related question of whether mitigation of damages is
required of the landlord, has prompted numerous
discussions of the dual doctrinal underpinnings of
landlord-tenant law, which stem from ancient
property ^aw concepts gradually being modified by
principles of contract law. See, e.g., Lindsey v.
Normet, 405 U.S. 86, 87 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting in part) (ancient property notions replaced by
more realistic predominantly contractual analysis of
lease interests); Humbach, 60 Wash. U.L.Q. 1213;
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Berkman, Duty of Commercial Landlords to Mitigate: Some Thoughts on Danpar Associates, 55
Conn. B.J. 339 (1981); Kwall, Retained Jurisdiction
in Damage Actions Based on Anticipatory Breach:
A Missing Link in Landlord-Tenant jLa% 37 Case
W. Res. L. Rev. 273 (1986). While we are cognizant
of the deep doctrinal strains such commentators
have noted in the law relating to leaseholds, we find
it unnecessary to explore those doctrinal concerns in
detail here.
.'•• It suffices to say that modern landlord-tenant
relationships, while steeped in the tradition of
ancient property law, have taken on substantive
.characteristics so similar to commercial transactions
that certain of the legal principles developed in the
law of contracts in the context of commercial transactions are now appropriately applied to leases,
regardless of whether use is made of labels derived
from the law of property conveyance or of contract.
Our concern with substance rather than form is
reflected in the law we apply in the present case with
respect to the manner in which a lease may be terminated and to the requirement that a nonbreaching
party must act reasonably to mitigate damages.
^Whether these rules are labeled as deriving from
^property law or contract law is of little concern.
4. The trial court actually referred to the date judgment was entered rather than the date of trial. The
rules of law we address here require that damages be
determined by reference to the date of trial, so that
proof of actual mitigation efforts and successes up
to the time of trial can be considered in setting
damage awards. Therefore, on remand the trial t
{court should recalculate the damage award by reference to the trial date. The date on which judgment
is entered is not relevant under the rules we now
apply.
5. The precise language of the awaid was as follows
Plaintiffs are awarded judgment against
Defendants for the remaining payments
due under said lease in the amount of
$1,100.00 for each month, due on the
first of each month, beginning [with the
trial date] and continuing until the expiration of the Lease term on October 31,
1985 minus any amounts, after subtra
cting the costs and expenses of reletting,
Plaintiffs may obtain through reletting
the premises.
6. It should be noted that, absent the language in
paragraph 19, the result would likely be the same
under the duty to mitigate we recognize today.
7. Although the parties to this appeal did not bring
It to this Court's attention, there is a section of the
Utah Code that provides some legislative guidance
as to how the question of a mitigation obligation
might be answered in a different setting. Section 7836-12.6, which is part of the forcible entry and
detainer chapter of the,Code, provides in relevant
part:
(1) In the event of abandonment the
owner may retake the premises and
attempt to rent them at a fair rental
value and the tenant who abandoned the
premises shall be liable:
(a) for the entire rent due for the remainder of the term; or
(b) for rent accrued during the period
necessary to re-rent the premises at a
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fair' rental value, plus the difference
between the fair rental value and the
rent agreed to in the prior rental agreement, plus a reasonable commission for
the renting of the premises and the
costs, if any, necessary to restore the
rental unit to its condition when rented
by the tenant less normal wear and tear,
This subsection applies, if less than
Subsection (a) notwithstanding that the
owner did not re-rent the premises
Utah Code Ann. §78-36-12.6 (1987) Sex generally Backman, Landlord-Tenant Law-A
Perspective on Reform m Utah, 1981 Utah L. Rev. 727,
738-39.
We have never decided whether tins hnguage
imposes an affirmative obligation to mitigate by
reletting, as might well be argued Our decision in
the present case is not controlled by section 78-3612.6 because we have previously construed it to
apply only when the tenant has "abandoned" the
premises without giving notice. See Fashion Place
Assocs. v. Glad Rags, Inc., 754 P.2d 940, 941 (Utah
1988); Utah Code Ann. §§78-36-l2.3(3),-12.6
(1987). Here, Mutual gave notice to the Reids when
it vacated and thus did not "abandon" the premises
within the meaning of the statute.
8. The concept of mitigation of damages is grounded in traditional contract law principles and is
also known as the doctrine of "avoidable consequences." Under this doctrine, a party injured by a
contract breach may not recover damages that he or
she, with reasonable effort, could have avoided. See
Angelos v. First Interstate Bank, 671 P.2d 772, 777
(Utah 1983); Restatement (Second) of Contract
§350 (1981); 5A Corbin,* Corbm on Contracts,
§1039(1964).
9. The commentators also note a variant of this
approach, which may be termed a single-recovery
rule, under which the landlord is limited to a single
remedy for all obligations under the lease agreement. The landlord must elect between waiting to
bring suit after the term has ended or bringing suit
earlier and effectively forfeiting later accruing rents
See Kwall, Retained Jurisdiction m Damage Actions
Based on Anticipatory Breach: A Missing Link m
Landlord-Tenant Law, 37 Case W. Res. L. Rev
273, 330 (1986); Humbach, 60 Wash. U.L.Q. at
1251. We reject this variant for much the same
reasons we find the multiple-cause-of-action
approach to be Unsatisfactory.
10. Some courts following the anticipatory-breach
approach have dealt with the concern over awarding
speculative damages by arbitrarily limiting the landlord's recovery to rents accruing in a period
shorter than the lease term, a period for which
damages can be projected with some certainty. See
Kwall, 37 Case W. Res. L. Rev. at 285-89; 2
Powell, The Law of Real Property 1249(1 J, at 17
65. We find this stunted recovery rule also to b
unsatisfactory.
11. Because the entire, claim of the landlord against
the tenant as it had accrued through the time of trial
would be adjudicated in the initial judgment n
would be final for purposes of appeal.
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H O W E , Associate Chief Justice: (Concurring
and Dissenting)
I concur in all of the majority opinion
except in that part which holds that the trial
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court's determination that there had not been
a constructive eviction of Mutual is supported
by the evidence. In my opinion, the uncontroverted evidence of the noise created by Intermountain and its affect on Mutual demonstrate that a constructive eviction did occur.,
Testimony from both Mutual and Intermountain personnel is in substantial agreement as
to the frequency and intensity of the noise. It
clearly met the standard % for a constructive
eviction established by our case law, i.e., that
the landlord's actions or failure to act, deprives the tenant of the beneficial enjoyment of
the demised premises or materially impairs
such enjoyment. Barker v. Utah Oil Refining
Co., I l l Utah 308, 178 P.2d 386 (1947). The
trial court's refusal to so find is "clearly erroneous" even when'due deference is given to
that court's opportunity to judge the credibility of the witnesses. Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a).
The trial court's determination that there was
not a constructive eviction is a conclusion of
law which is not entitled to any deference by
us. Zions First National Bank v. National
American Title Insurance Co., 749 P.2d 651
(Utah 1988). The trial court also»erred in
employing an erroneous standard when it
relied on the fact that the noise and other
cumulative acts of plaintiffs did not cause any
loss of business.
Mutual leased about 60 percent of the main
floor of plaintiffs' building. Two weeks later,
plaintiffs leased the balance'of the space on
that floor to Intermountain. Both tenants had
to use a common entry and hallway, and
employees and clients of Mutual had to pass
by the entrance of Intermountain to reach the
entrance of Mutual's space. Mutual conducted
an insurance business which included rendering service to policyholders and selling insu-,
ranee to prospective buyers. In contrast, Intermountain used its space mainly to instruct
and motivate salespersons and sales trainees to
sell housewares door to door. Testimony was
adduced from agents and employees of Mutual
and from principals and agents of Intermountain that three days each week, up to 45
salespersons and trainees were crowded into a
room adjoining Mutual's space for training
sessions at Intermountain's offices in the
building.
During the course of the training sessions,
Mutual's beneficial enjoyment of its leased
premises was materially impaired by the foil-*
owing acts of Intermountain: Instructors of
Intermountain would conduct a motivational
exercise known as a "fire-up" drill in which
the participants would, in unison, clapping
and shouting out loud, count backward from
number ten down to one, followed by a* shout,
"I feel great!" This was followed by loud
clapping, cheering, and the stamping of feet.
On one occasion, the instructor threw a pie in
the face of someone to get the participants'
attention and interest. Applause ^ and loud
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laughter occurred at other times in response to
stimuli from the instructor. Loud stereo rock
music* was played to create an atmosphere
compatible with the young trainees. Intermountain freely used the hall leading to Mutual's
rented space fof the purpose of serving refreshments to participants during break times.
Also,. registration tables were set up in the
hallway, and trainees were permitted to engage
in practice sessions with one another in the
hall. The large number of participants at times
overloaded available restrooms and, on some
occasions, used all the paper towels and littered the floor: Intermountain placed in the
hall boxes of merchandise which were,to be
sold or delivered to salespersons or customers.
One witness described the hallway as looking
like a warehouse. The' participants' at times
filled up the building's parking lot, as well as
all available nearby street parking.
' All of this conduct by Intermountain was
highly disruptive' to Mutual and worked to
deprive it of the quiet enjoyment of its leased
premises to which it was entitled. As employees and clients of Mutual would attempt to
make their way through the hall during training sessions, T they *- would on occasion be
stopped or directed by Intermountain personnel into the sales and training sessions. When
loud noise would emanate / from Intermountain's premises, Mutual would have to terminate its activities until the disturbance ceased.
Mutual's employees i and agents had to either
stop or delay their telephone conversations
and sales presentations they were making to
prospective buyers and apologize for the disruption. Employees and clients of»Mutual
experienced difficulty in finding parking places
when the training sessions were being conducted. The overuse of the restrooms by Intermountain deprived Mutual of a clean and wellsupplied facility.
During the sixteen months that, Mutual *
occupied plaintiffs' building, it made numerous complaints to them about Intermountain's conduct. Beginning on June 10, 1981,
Mutual sent a series /of letters to plaintiffs
complaining primarily / of the noise. Other
letters were se/it on August 5, October 12,
November 17,,and December 15. In the last
letter, Mutual requested that plaintiffs take
appropriate action to correct the noise situation immediately and gave notice that should
disturbances continue after five days, Mutual
would consider the lease to be breached and
would vacate the premises* Plaintiffs early on
took the position that l there was nothing
improper about Intermountain's conduct and
operation, but they did meet with the principals - of Intermountain • on several, occasions
and finally had their attorney write Intermountain, requesting that it cease and desist from
further noise. Intermountain temporarily did
desist from creating loud noise and agreed that
it would not conduct "fire-up" drills with *
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• their salespeople before 5:30 p.m., by which> stated that Mutual was endeavoring to conduct
time most of Mutual's employees had left the a professional business on a different level
.building.i However, two principals of Interm-i from that of Intermountain. Mutual did not
ountain and two of its salespersons testified make a hasty decision to vacate but exhausted
that in January 1982, they broke*that agree-{ all of its resources and patience to solve the
ment. One of the principals admitted that he disruption. But despite its pleas and plaintiffs1
conducted several, fire-up drills in January! attempts, the operation of vthe two side-by
prior to 5:30 p.m. just to "ruffle the feathers" side businesses was simply not compatible
of Mutual's manager.' Finally» on February * The trial judge erred in requiring Mutual to
'12, 1982, Mutual paid its / rent current and tolerate and suffer more noise than it had
t moved from the .building, giving notice to
•already endured.
plaintiffs that its request as contained in its t~ The trial court also based its decision in part
letter of December 15 had not been met.
on the faulty premise that Mutual had not
."•'The trial court made no findings as to the , shown that it had lost any business. Our cases
quantum or frequency of the noise* but con-' do not require that such a showing be made to
eluded simply that "although the court finds constitute a constructive eviction. Barker v
the ^noise made by Intermountain Marketing Utah Oil Refining Co., Ill Utah at 312, 178
was distracting to defendants, it was not of P.2d at 388, held that there is a constructive
sufficient magnitude to warrant abandonment eviction when the landlord, without intent to
of the leased premises." With that conclusion I oust the tenant, "does some act which deprives
cannot agree.' It is not clear just how much the tenant of the beneficial enjoyment of the
noise the trial court I thought a tenant mustj
demised premises or materially impairs such
Ltolerate before there is a breach of the coveenjoyment." That is all that is required, and
nant of the lease that the tenant may have
the fact that Mutual did not attempt to prove
quiet possession and enjoyment, such as was
any loss of business is immaterial.
contained in the lease here. Our case law is
I would reverse the judgment entered below
clear that constructive eviction occurs when
and remand the case to the trial court with
the tenant is deprived of the beneficial enjoyinstructions to dismiss plaintiffs' complaint.
ment of the demised premises or»his enjoyStewart, Justice, concurs in the
ment is materially impaired. Barker v. Utah
Oil Refining Co.% 111 Utah at 312, 178 P.2d concurring and dissenting opinion of Associate
at 388. One cannot read the record in this case. Chief Justice Howe.
;without being impressed that Mutual was longsuffering and endured unnecessary outbursts
of noise from its adjoining tenant at least
Cue as
from June 1981 to>February 1982. The testi-'
110 Utah Adv. Rep. 22
mony at trial from six agents and secretaries
rof Mutual and from four principals and saleIN I f IE SUPREME COURT
smen from Intermountain was that the loud
OF T H E STATE OF U T A H
outbursts of noise continued unabated right up
to the time Mutual vacated. * Mutual took
recordings of some of the outbursts of noise' UTAH STATE COALITION OF SENIOR
CITIZENS, Utility Consumer Action Group,
and documented them as to dates and times. >
•^One,of the plaintiffs, Mrs/Reid, had an Salt Lake Community Action Program, Utah
office on the second floor above Intermoun- Issues Information Program, Utah Welfare
tain and testified that while she could hear the Rights Organization, and Crossroads Urban
outbursts of noise, the sounds were muffled. Center,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
This was the entire extent of plaintiffs' rebuv.
ttal ' to Mutual's and Inter mountain's testimony respecting the intensity of the noise. UTAH POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY,
Defendant and Appellee
'Undoubtedly the noise was muffled when it
reached Mrs/Reid because there was a solid
cement floor separating the second floor from No. 20152
the main floor. While plaintiffs disputed that FILED: June 12, 1989
parking was a problem, they did not contradict the testimony of several Mutual agents Third District, Salt Lake County
that the frequent outbursts of'noise were so Honorable David B. Dee
upsetting that they did not attempt to conduct ATTORNEYS:
any sales work' on the premises," but were Bruce Plenk, Salt Lake City, for appellants
forced , to ' visit prospective buyers in their
Robeft Gordon, David Lloyd, Edward
homes. Mutual's space and Intermountain's
Hunter, Salt Lake City, for appci^e
space were separated only by a thin portable
wall installed over the carpet. One of the principals ' of- Intermountain testified that its
business and Mutual's business "clashed." He
* UTAH ADVANCE REPORTS
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(c) Filing prior to entry of judgment or order. Except as provided in
Paragraph (b) of this rule, a notice of appeal filed after the announcement of a
decision, a judgment, or an order but before the entry of the judgment or order
of the district court, juvenile court, or circuit court shall be treated as filed
after such entry and on the day thereof.
(d) Additional or cross-appeal. If a timely notice of appeal is filed by a
party, any other party may file a notice of appeal within 14 days after the date
on which the first notice of appeal was filed or within the time otherwise
prescribed by Paragraph (a) of this rule, whichever period last expires.
(e) Extension of time to appeal. The court from which the appeal is
taken, upon a showing of excusable neglect or good cause, may extend the
time for filing a notice of appeal upon motion filed not later than 30 days after
the expiration of the time prescribed by Paragraph (a) of this rule. A motion to
extend time that is filed before expiration of the prescribed time may be heard
ex parte unless the court from which the appeal is taken requires otherwise.
Notice of any such motion that is filed after the expiration of the prescribed
time shall be given to the other parties in accordance with the rules of practice
of the court from which the appeal is taken. No extension shall exceed 30 days
past the prescribed time or 10 days from the date of entry of the order granting the motion, whichever occurs later.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
tion on an appellate court. Anderson v.
Schwendiman, 764 P.2d 999 (Utah Ct. App.
1988).

ANALYSIS

Filing with county clerk.
Final order or judgment.
Post-judgment motion.
Premature notice.
Reconsideration of order.
Timeliness.
—Date of notice.
Cited.
Filing with county clerk.
Filing with the county clerk was not a timely
filing with the juvenile court, where there was
no indication when the clerk transmitted a
copy of the notice of appeal to the juvenile
court, and the original was returned to appellant's counsel. State In re M.S., 102 Utah Adv.
Rep. 63 (Ct. App. 1989).
Final order or judgment.
Juvenile court's order for temporary confinement in a youth facility for observation and
assessment prior to a final disposition was not
a final order, for purposes of appeal, because it
did not finally dispose of all issues, including
the rights of the juvenile and/or his mother's
rights as parental custodian. In re T.D.C., 748
P.2d 201 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
Post-judgment motion.
Filing a post-judgment motion of a type
listed in Subdivision (b) suspends the finality
of the judgment, and a notice of appeal filed
prior to disposition of such a motion by entry of
a signed order is not effective to confer jurisdic-

Premature notice.
A notice of appeal filed after a ruling on a
motion to alter or amend a judgment has been
announced, but before the entry of an order
disposing of the motion, is premature and does
not confer jurisdiction on the court. Anderson
v. Schwendiman, 764 P.2d 999 (Utah Ct. App.
1988).
Reconsideration of order.
The Court of Appeals declined to reconsider
and overrule its prior denial of the state's request to dismiss an appeal as untimely. State
ex rel. C.Y. v. Ya+es, 96 Utah Adv. Rep. 9 (Ct.
App. 1988).
Timeliness.
Case was temporarily remanded to the juvenile court in order to allow that court to make
a determination whether an order extending
the time for appeal should be entered by the
juvenile court under Subdivision (e) of this
rule, when it was not apparent whether the
notice of appeal was either timely filed or
deemed timely filed by the juvenile court. State
In re M.S., 102 Utah Adv. Rep. 63 (Ct. App.
1989).
—Date of notice.
In determining whether a notice of appeal is
timely filed and establishes jurisdiction in an
appellate court, the appellate court is bound by
the filing date on the notice of appeal transmit-
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granting or denying any other such motion* A notice of appeal filed before the
disposition of any of the above motions shall have no effect. A new notice of
appeal must be filed within the prescribed time measured from the entry of
the order of the district court disposing of the motion as provided above.
(c) Filing prior to entry of judgment or order. Except as provided in
Paragraph (b) of this rule, a notice of appeal filed after the announcement of a
decision, judgment or order but before the entry of the judgment or order of
the district court shall be treated as filed after such entry and on the day
thereof.
(d) Additional or cross appeal. If a timely notice of appeal is filed by a
party, any other party may file a notice of appeal within 14 days after the date
on which the first notice of appeal was filed, or within the time otherwise
prescribed by Paragraph (a) of this rule, whichever period last expires.
(e) Extension of time to appeal. The district court, upon a showing of
excusable neglect or good cause, may extend the time for filing a notice of
appeal upon motion filed not later than 30 days after the expiration of the
time prescribed by Paragraph (a) of this rule. Any such motion which is filed
before expiration of the prescribed time may be ex parte unless the district
court otherwise requires. Notice of any such motion which is filed after expiration of the prescribed time shall be given to the other parties in accordance
with the district court rules of practice. No extension shall exceed 30 days past
the prescribed time or 10 days from the date of entry of the order granting the
motion, whichever occurs later.
Advisory Committee Note. — Paragraph
(a). Coupled with Rule 3, this paragraph requires that a notice of appeal be filed with the
clerk of the district court within 30 days after
the date of entry of judgment or order from
which the appeal is taken. There are two significant changes in appellate procedure from
prior practice under Rule 73(a) URCivP: (1) the
time frame within which the appeal must be
taken is 30 days rather than one month; and
(2) the 30-day period commences to run after
the date of the "entry of the judgment or order"
rather than "from the date of the entry of the
judgment or order in the Register of Actions."
The one month time frame under prior Rule
73(a) was determined to be both inconsistent
and confusing, at least measured against a
more definite 30-day time limit. Computation
of time is defined under Rule 22(a). It is intended that the 30-day time limit within which
to appeal from a final judgment or order of the
district court or a juvenile court shall be applicable in all cases, notwithstanding a statute or
other rule to the contrary (see § 78-2-4 Utah
Code Ann. 1953, as amended), with the exception that in statutory forcible entry and unlawful detainer actions, an appeal shall be taken
within ten days from the entry of the final
judgment or order appealed from. The 30-day
time limit will qualify the "one month" appeal
period set out in § 78-3a-51 Utah Code Ann.
1953, as amended, for a direct appeal from a
juvenile court.

Because of the conversion to microfilm filing
process by the clerks of the various district
courts, the Register of Actions Book is no longer maintained in some counties as contemplated in prior Rules 73(a) and 79(a) URCivP.
The date of "entry of the judgment or order"
from which the appeal is taken is considered to
be the day on which the judgment or order is
"filed" with the district court clerk. See Rule
58A(c) URCivP. It is the committee's judgment
that when the clerk receives and stamps-in the
judgment or order, the document is "filed" under Rule 58A and under this Rule 4.
This paragraph requires that a notice of appeal from a final judgment or order in a criminal case be filed within 30 days after the date
of entry of the judgment or order appealed
from, State v. Johnson, 635 P.2d 36 (Utah
1981), except that in a capital case where the
death sentence has been imposed, the case is
automatically appealed to and reviewed by the
court. Rule 26(h) URCrimP. It is the committee's view that even in capital cases involving
the death sentence, a notice of appeal should be
filed under this paragraph so that the appellate process incident to preparation and transmittal of the record may commence in a timely
manner.
Paragraph (b). This paragraph retains the
concept under prior Rule 73(a) URCivP that a
timely filed motion under Rule 50(b), 52(b) or
Rule 59 shall toll the date from which the time
for appeal commences to run In the event of
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such a motion, the time for appeal under paragraph (a) commences from the date of entry of
the order denying a new trial or granting or
denying any other motion. The paragraph
adopts the provision of Rule 4(a)(4) FRAP that
a notice of appeal filed before the disposition of
a motion under Rule 50(b), 52(b), or 59 has no
effect and must be filed within the prescribed
time after the entry of the order by the district
court disposing of the motion.
Paragraph (c). This paragraph has no counterpart in prior Utah practice. It is, in substantial part, an adoption of Rule 4(a)(2) FRAP.
Paragraph (d). This paragraph changes the
practice in Utah with regard to cross-appeals
(see prior Rule 74(b) URCivP) and requires
that a notice of the cross-appeal be filed within
14 days after the date of the first notice of appeal. The paragraph adopts substantially the
time period and concept of cross-appeal in Rule
4(a)(3) FRAP.
Paragraph (e). This paragraph retains the

Rule 4

prior practice under Rule 73(a) URCivP that
the time for filing a notice of appeal may be
extended by the district court, upon a showing
of excusable neglect or good cause, if a motion
for extension is filed not later than 30 days
after the expiration of the time prescribed in
paragraphs (a) or (b). The application shall be
on motion and may be ex parte (although ex
parte practice is not encouraged) if filed prior
to the expiration of the time for appeal. The
district court may not grant an extension exceeding 30 days past the original time for appeal or ten days from the date of entry of the
order granting the motion, whichever occurs
later. Excusable neglect or good cause under
this paragraph refers generally to an extraordinary circumstance that prevented the movant from filing a timely notice of appeal and
not to inadvertence or oversight on the part of
counsel or to the failure of the client to authorize an appeal.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Attorney fees.
Entry of judgment.
Extension of time to appeal.
Filing of notice.
Final judgment.
Post-judgment motions.
Timeliness of notice.
Cited.
Attorney fees.
No cross-appeal is necessary where plaintiffs
merely sought attorney's fees incurred in defending their judgment on appeal. Wallis v.
Thomas, 632 P.2d 39 (Utah 1981).
Entry of judgment.
Unless Rule 2.9(b) of the District and Circuit
Court Rules of Practice has been complied
with, the judgment is not deemed "filed"
within the meaning of Rule 58A(c) of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure and the time for taking an appeal from that judgment under this
rule does not begin to run because the judgment has not been properly "entered." Calfo v.
D.C. Stewart Co., 717 P.2d 697 (Utah 1986).
Extension of time to appeal.
Neither U.R.C.P. 6(b), granting the court
power to extend a time limit where a failure to
act in time is due to excusable neglect generally, nor U.R.C.P. 60(b)(1), authorizing the
court to relieve from final judgment for inadvertence or excusable neglect, applies where a
notice of appeal has not been timely filed.
Holbrook v. Hodson, 24 Utah 2d 120, 466 P.2d
843 (1970).
A party could not extend the time for filing

an appeal simply by filing a "Motion for Reconsideration of Order Striking Petition and Motion for Relief from Final Judgment." Peay v.
Peay, 607 P.2d 841 (Utah 1980).
When the question of "excusable neglect"
arises in a jurisdictional context, as opposed to
a nonjurisdictional context, the standard contemplated thereby is a strict one; it is not
meant to cover the usual excuse that the lawyer is too busy, but is to cover emergency situations only. Prowswood, Inc. v. Mountain Fuel
Supply Co., 676 P.2d 952 (Utah 1984).
Filing of notice.
The mailing of a notice of appeal was not
equivalent to a filing of a notice of appeal.
Isaacson v. Dorius, 669 P.2d 849 (Utah 1983).
Final judgment.
Where the trial court signed two different
judgments but neither party served his prepared judgment on the other party before submitting it to the court, the filing of either judgment would be erroneous, and an appeal taken
from either is premature because the judgments are not properly "final." Larsen v.
Larsen, 674 P.2d 116 (Utah 1983).
Post-judgment motions.
Where a post-judgment motion was timely
filed under Rule 59(a)(6) of the Rules of Civil
Procedure to upset the judgment, and notices of
appeal from the judgment were filed after the
motion was made, but before the disposition of
the motion, the motion rendered the notices of
appeal ineffective, and notice of appeal had to
be filed within the required time from the date
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§ 706. Generally.
Aside from the question as to what parties arc entitled to appeal at all,18
questions may be presented as to whether a party, rightfully in the appellate
court, is entitled to have particular claims of error reviewed.13 Ordinarily appellate review of error in the court below may be had only at the instance and
for the benefit of a party to the proceeding below in which the error arose 14
An appellant cannot successfully complain on appeal on alleged error which
affects only another party who did not appeal or complain.15
§ 707", Rule that party not appealing is not entitled to assert error.
While an appellee who has not cross appealed may argue in the appellate
court in support of the decision appealed from,18 and in opposition to a claim
of error in the court below raised by the appellant,17 it is settled that ordinarthe ground of reversal, the higher appellate
court was compelled to presume that the reversal was not on a question of fact, although
the opinion of the intermediate appellate
court intimated its intention to reverse the
judgment of the trial court on the facts as well
as on the law. Spcnce v Ham, 163 NY 220,
57 NE 412.
11. Adverse interest as condition of right to
appeal, see §§ 178-185, supra; harmless or
prejudicial error generally, see §§ 776 et seq.,
infra.
12. See §§ 172 et scq., supra,
13. The two questions are not easily dis
tinguishable and in some cases it is not possible to determine from the report whether
the court was considering the right to appeal
or merely the right to have a particular issue
reviewed.
14. United States v Patterson, 15 How (US)
10, 14 L ed 578.
Where the appellant was not a pari;) to a
petition to reopen the case for the taking of
further testimony, he cannot successfully complain of the trial court's denial of that petition/ Re Wohlcber. 320 Pa 83, 181 A 479,
101 ALR 829.
Rule that only parties or their privies may
appeal, see §§ 173-176, supra.
15. Baum v Lynn. 72 Miss 932, 18 So 428;
Eastern Outfitting Co. v Manheim, 59 Wash
428, 110 P 2 3 .
Where the alleged liability on appellant's
part is independent of the alleged liability of
a codefendant, he cannot assign on appeal as
error in the court below that judgment was
rendered against him while the codefendant
was exonerated. Rawlings v Inglcbritzen, 211
Miss 760, 52 So 2d 630.
A defendant who did not cross-examine a
witness cannot raise on appeal the question
whether cross-examination by another defendant was unduly restricted.
Bingham v
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National Bank, Ml1", Monl I ">9, 72 P2d 90, 113
ALR 315.
Where a motion to punish a corporation
and its president for contempt of an injunction order alleges specific acts of violation
upon the part of the president, he will not
be heard to complain of the insufficiency of
its allegations as against the corporation. Ex
parte Genecov, 143 Tex 476, 186 SW2d 225,
160 ALR 1099, cert den 326 US 733, 90
L ed 436, 66 S Ct 41, reh den 326 US 808,
90 L ed 493, 66 S Ct 137.
Limitation of review to matters raised on.
appeal, see § 723, infra.
16. Philadelphia Casualty Co. v Fcchheimer
(CA6OI110) 220 F 401.
Without having filed a cross appeal, an
appellee may urge in support of the decision
appealed from any matter appearing in the
record even where his arguments involve an
attack on the reasoning of the court below
or an insistence on matter overlooked or
ignored by it. TarTke v Dunham, 352 US
280, 1 L e d 2d 314, 77 S Ct 307.
But see also State v Fairmont Creamery
Co. 153 Iowa 702, 133 NW 895, holding
that where only the state appealed from the
dismissal of an indictment, and the only
question presented for appellate review by the
state was the constitutionality of the statute
involved, the defendant, as appellee, could
not successfully urge the appellate court to
consider the question of the sufficiency of the
indictment, and to affirm the decision appealed
from because of insufficiency of the indictment.
17. Alexander v Cosdcn Pipe Line Co. 290
US 484, 78 L ed 452, 54 S Ct 292; Robbins
v Beatty, 246 Iowa 80, 67 NW2d 12; Abbott
v Thome, 34 Wash 692, 76 P 302; Fleming
v Northern Tissue Paper Mill, 135 Wis 157,
114 NW 841.
The appellee may, for ii istance, urge that
the decision appealed from, though based on
an erroneous reason, should nevertheless be
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ily an appellee who did not file a cross appeal is not entitled to an appellate
review to obtain a decision more favorable to him than that appealed from by
the other party.1* For instance, an appellee who has not cross appealed may
not seek in the appellate court a determination of the amount imolvcd more
favorable to him than that made by the court below.19 Errors prejudi* ially
affecting an appellee who made no cross appeal are not within the scope of
appellate review, despite his objections, in the court below, to those errors.20
The claim of one who took no appeal from a decision adverse to him is not
before the appellate court upon appeal by another party not in privity with
him, even where the other party has a practical interest in sustaining the claim
of the nonappealing party. 1 Unless the decision below is reversed in favor of
the appellant, it must on appeal stand even though it is not as favorable to
upheld on another and sound reason. JafTke v
Dunham. 352 US 280, 1 L ed 2d 314, 77
S Ct 307.
One whose right to claim a fund under a
will has been denied by the court below,
which, however, awarded him the fund under
a claim of equitable recoupment, is not, where
the other party has appealed, prevented, by
his failure to take a cross appeal, from asserting in the appellate court, in support
of the decree of the court below, that it
misconstrued the will.
Cleveland Clinic
Foundation v Humphrys (CA6 Ohio) 97 F
2d 849, 121 ALR 163, cert den 305 US 628,
83 L ed 403, 59 S Ct 93.
A party granted a new trial by the trial.
court has no occasion to appeal, but he should
not be precluded from showing by the record
brought up by his adversary any and all
errors committed in the trial of the cause;
and all questions presented by the record and
necessary for the proper disposition of the
case will be passed upon. Smart v Kansas
City, 208 Mo 162, 105 SW 709.
18. Helvering v PfcifTer, 302 US 247, 82
L ed 231, 58 S Ct 159; Wendc v Chicago City
R. Co. 271 111 437, 111 NE 275; Robbins v
Beatty, 246 Iowa 80, 67 NW2d 12; Holland v
Shaffer, 162 Kan 474, 178 P2d 235, 173 ALR
845; Kelley v Burnam, 305 Ky 544. 204 SW
2d 965, 174 ALR 531; Mugford v Baltimore,
185 Md 266, 44 A2d 745, 162 ALR 1101;
Magill v Magill, 317 Mass 89, 56 NE2d 892,
154 ALR 1406; Ogcns v Northern Industrial
Chemical Co. 304 Mass 401, 24 NE2d 1, 126
ALR 280; Caldwell v Travelers' Ins. Co. 305
Mo 619, 267 SW 907, 39 ALR 56; Timber
Structures, Inc. v C. W. S. Grinding & Machine Works, 191 Or 231, 229 P2d 623, 25
ALR2d 1358; Kerens Nat. Bank v Stockton,
120 Tex 546, 40 SW2d 7, 77 ALR 362;
Merager v Turnbull, 2 Wash 2d 711, 99 P2d
434, 127 ALR 1142.
Annotation:
1 L ed 2d 1820 (United States
Supreme Court cases).
A respondent or an appellee may urge any
matter appearing in the record in support
of a judgment, but he may not attack it
even on grounds asserted in the court below,
in an effort to have the appellate court re-

verse it, when he himself has not sought review of the whole judgment, or of that portion
which is adverse to him. Letulle v Scoficld,
308 US 415, 84 L ed 355, 60 S Ct 311, reh
den 309 US 694, 84 L ed 1035, 60 S Ct 465.
An appellee who has not taken a cross
appeal is not entitled, in equity proceedings,
to have the decree revised in his favor, on
the ground that it is against the weight of the
evidence. Morley Constr. Co. v Maryland
Casualty Co. 300 US 185, 81 L ed 593, 57
S Ct 325, reh den 300 US 687, 81 L ed
888, 57 S Ct 505.
The question of the expiration of the limitation period cannot be considered on appeal
by the plaintiff from a nonsuit where the
defendant did not appeal. Pearson v Tuohy
Bros. Co. 113 Or 230, 231 P 129, 36 ALR
1113.
Ordinarily, in the absence of a cross appeal, the decision appealed from fixes the
law of the case insofar as the appellee is
concerned Bennett v State Corporation Com.
157 Kan 539, 142 P2d 810, 150 ALR 1140;
Ecklcy v Bonded Adjustment Co. 30 Wash
2d 96, 190 P2d 718, 1 ALR2d 717.
19. Mechanics Universal Joint Co. v Culhanc, 299 US 51, 81 L ed 33. 57 S Ct 81;
Stott v Johnston, 36 Cal 2d 861, 229 P2d 348,
28 ALR2d 580; Merchants Discount Corp v
Federal Street Corp. 300 Mass 167, 14 NE2d
155. 118 ALR 412; Timber Structures, Inc.
v C. W. S Grinding & Machine Works, 191
Or 231, 229 P2d 623, 25 ALR2d 1358.
20. Salter v Ulrich, 22 Cal 2d 26'*, 138
P2d 7, 146 ALR 1344; Beach v Cooke, 28
NY 508.
On appeal by the defendant from an order
overruling a demurrer to the plaintiff's amended petition, the plaintiff, if he fails to cross
appeal as he might have done under the
provisions of the applicable statute, cannot be
heard to complain of an adxerse ruling of
the trial court in refusing to consider allegations added by the amendment. S< hxiltc v
Westborough. Inc. 163 Kan 111, 180 P2d 278,
172 ALR 259.
1. Caskins v Caskins, 311 Ky 59, 221 SW
2d 374, 13 ALR2d 970.
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